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Pay-for-performance (P4P), which is a payment
method that provides incentives to healthcare
providers based upon the quality of their outcomes
rather than simple healthcare service delivery [1], has
been rapidly spreading across the world [2-6]. In the
United States, this reimbursement method has been
adopted not only in private markets such as the
Integrated Healthcare Association [7] and Bridge to
Excellence [8] but also in Medicare through the
Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration Project [9]
and Physician Group Practice Demonstration Project
[10]. Among other western countries, the United
Kingdom has applied a P4P program (Quality and
Outcomes Framework) to contracts with general
practitioners [11] and Australia has adopted the
Practice Incentive Program to improve quality of care
[12]. In addition, the Health Insurance Review and
Assessment Service (HIRA) in South Korea has also
conducted a P4P demonstration project, the Value
Incentive Program (VIP), for improving the quality of
care for acute myocardial infarction and Caesarian
section patients in the tertiary teaching hospitals since
2007 [2].
Although many countries and health plans have
adopted P4P programs, it is still controversial whether
P4P is a successful strategy to increase the quality of
care because the effectiveness of P4P and its primary
target varies among programs. Many studies have
reported positive effects of P4P on quality improvement
[5,8,13-16]. However, on the other hand, several studies
have raised questions such as the lack of effect [17,18],
unintended consequences [16,19,20], disparities [21],
ethical issues [22], and so on.
Therefore, to create more successful P4P programs,
purchasers (i.e., governments or health plans) should
consider all aspects of P4P from its contemplation phase
to final evaluation phase. To do this, Dudley and
Rosenthal [23] presented P4P checklists, which included
http://dx.doi.org/10.3961/jpmph.2012.45.3.137
pISSN 1975-8375
eISSN 2233-4521
Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health 
May 2012, Vol. 45 No. 3, 137-147
This article is available at http://jpmph.org/
Lessons From Healthcare Providers’ Attitudes Toward 
Pay-for-performance: What Should Purchasers Consider in
Designing and Implementing a Successful Program?
Jin Yong Lee
1, Sang-Il Lee
2, Min-Woo Jo
2
1Department of Preventive Medicine, Konyang University College of Medicine, Daejeon; 
2Department of Preventive Medicine, University of Ulsan College of Medicine, Seoul, Korea
We conducted a systematic review to summarize providers’ attitudes toward pay-for-performance (P4P), focusing on their
general attitudes, the effects of P4P, their favorable design and implementation methods, and concerns. An electronic
search was performed in PubMed and Scopus using selected keywords including P4P. Two reviewers screened target
articles using titles and abstract review and then read the full version of the screened articles for the final selections. In
addition, one reference of screened articles and one unpublished report were also included. Therefore, 14 articles were
included in this study. Healthcare providers’ attitudes on P4P were summarized in two ways. First, we gathered their
general attitudes and opinions regarding the effects of P4P. Second, we rearranged their opinions regarding desirable
P4P design and implementation methods, as well as their concerns. This study showed the possibility that some
healthcare providers still have a low level of awareness about P4P and might prefer voluntary participation in P4P. In
addition, they felt that adequate quality indicators and additional support for implementation of P4P would be needed.
Most healthcare providers also had serious concerns that P4P would induce unintended consequences. In order to
conduct successful implementation of P4P, purchaser should make more efforts such as increasing providers’ level of
awareness about P4P, providing technical and educational support, reducing their burden, developing a cooperative
relationship with providers, developing more accurate quality measures, and minimizing the unintended consequences.
Key words: Pay-for-performance, Healthcare provider, Attitude, Quality, Unintended consequences
J Prev Med Public Health 2012;45(3):137-147
4 4Q QF FD DJ JB BM M" "S SU UJ JD DM MF F
Corresponding author : Min-Woo Jo, MD, PhD
88 Olympic-ro 43-gil, Songpa-gu, Seoul 138-736, Korea
Tel: +82-2-3010-4264, Fax: +82-2-477-2898, E-mail: mdjominwoo@paran.com
Received: 31 January 2012, Accepted: 15 May 2012
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/)
which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
cc  +JO:POH-FFFUBM
+1SFW.FE1VCMJD)FBMUI	

20 questions for purchasers to consider in running P4P
programs; these questions can be categorized into 4
stages according to which phase they relate to
(contemplation, design, implementation, and evaluation
phase).
However, before doing this, the first step would be to
gather providers’ opinions toward P4P programs. This
is very critical because healthcare providers are not
merely primary stakeholders but also important
players. The failure of financial incentives to increase
cancer screening in Medicare managed care could be
explained by a lack of physician awareness [17]. In
addition, interventions in the practice site could
improve healthcare quality in P4P [15]. Therefore, it
would be difficult to implement P4P programs
successfully without healthcare providers’ support, and
they could help to achieve P4P’s goals. Also,
providers’ concerns can contain valuable information
that can help purchasers redesign programs to have as
positive an effect as possible on the quality of
healthcare [23,24].
We conducted a systematic review to summarize
providers’ attitudes toward P4P, focusing on their
general attitudes, the effects of P4P, their favored design
and implementation methods, and concerns. After the
review, we will discuss what actions purchasers should
take to make more successful P4P programs.
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I.  Operational Definition of Pay-for-
performance
There are various definitions for P4P for
organizations. For example, “the use of payment
methods and other incentives to encourage quality
improvement and patient-focused high value care” [25];
“incentives (generally financial) to reward attainment of
positive health results” [26]; and “transfer of money or
material goods conditional on taking a measurable action
or achieving a pre-determined performance target” [27].
In order to perform systematic review, we needed to
identify our own definition of P4P. In this article, P4P
was operationally defined by any kind of financial
incentives or rewards to healthcare providers aiming to
improve quality of care. That is, we decided to pay
attention to the fact that “pay” refers to financial benefits
from purchasers and “performance” means only quality
performance (or outcome).
II. Search Strategy 
A flow chart of the brief search strategy is shown in
Figure 1. One librarian searched for published articles in
two electronic databases, PubMed and Scopus, using
selected key words. The electronic search was performed
from 22 to 23, December, 2011 using the following
keywords: pay for performance; incentive or
reimbursement; performance or quality; payment or
purchasing; health personnel, healthcare provider,
physician, nurses, or hospital; attitude, behavior, position,
or response; survey or questionnaires. Publication time
and type were not limited. Two reviewers (Jo MW and
Lee JY) screened target articles for analysis from results
of electronic searches using titles and abstract review.
Table 1 presents the inclusion and exclusion criteria used
in the target articles chosen by the reviewers. Then, two
reviewers read the full version of the screened articles
and chose the final articles. In addition, references and
forward citations of screened articles were also searched
without any time limitations. One unpublished report was
also added by expert opinion. Disagreements on the final
choice of articles were resolved by discussions on the
operational definition of P4P among the authors. Because
the objective of this study was not to draw a single
conclusion, the quality and heterogeneity of studies were
not used for exclusion criteria and just considered in
discussions. Among 1835 articles from PubMed, Scopus,
and expert opinion, on the basis of their title and abstract,
58 articles were selected for full-text review. This review
process provided 14 articles eligible for our analysis: 13
from the reviewed articles and 1 mentioned in the
reference lists of several reviewed articles.
III. Summarization of Information
General information from the studies was extracted
from the 14 articles that were finally selected: citation,
country, program, target and eligible population of study,
study participants, and survey method (Table 2).
Healthcare providers’ attitudes on P4P were summarized
in two ways (Tables 3 and 4). First, we gathered their
general attitudes and opinions regarding the effects of P4P.
General attitudes included three items: level of awareness,
agreement or disagreement, and the reasons why they
support or oppose P4P. Providers’ opinions on the effects
of P4P were reviewed in terms of their behavioral
changes, effects on quality of care, and financial impact.
Second, we rearranged their opinions regarding desirable
P4P design and implementation methods, as well as their
concerns. Because there were differences in the context)FBMUIDBSF1SPWJEFSTs "UUJUVEFTGPS11
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including target population, design, or goal of P4P and the
healthcare system, the original descriptions in the selected
articles were used in this paper if possible.
3&46-54
I. Study Descriptions for Articles Included in
the Final Analysis 
Table 2 shows the study descriptions including the first
author and publication year, countries, the specific P4P
program, target population, eligible bias, target
population, and survey methods. Among the 14 studies,
11 studies were conducted in US and least 3 studies
analyzed P4P in the US and UK, Korea, and Canada.
The targets of the surveys were individual physicians in
6 studies, hospitals or physician organizations in 5
studies, and directors or physician executives in 2
studies. The total number of respondents in each study
ranged from 16 to 1243. In a survey method, a mailed
survey including postal service (6) was most common
followed by interview (4), web-based survey including
online questionnaire (3), fax (2), and poll (1).
II. General Attitudes Toward P4P and Their
Views on the Effects of P4P
We summarized providers’ general attitudes toward
P4P and their view on the effects resulting from P4P
(Table 3). Table 3 showed the possibility that some
healthcare providers still have a low level of awareness
about P4P [28-31]. For example, McDonald and Roland
[28] indicated that many physicians were not aware of
the target contents or had poor understanding of the
relation between performance and incentives payments
received. Also, Lee et al. [29] mentioned that the
majority of healthcare providers did not know or
understand what a P4P program was. Lastly, Young et al.
[30] reported that physicians were fairly negative about
their understanding of the details of P4P programs and
the amount of incentive money being offered to them. 
We investigated why healthcare providers support or
oppose P4P (Table 3). Their opinions varied according
to their P4P settings. Proponents stated that 1) if the
Table 1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
1. Pay-for-performance definition: The programs include our concept of
pay-for-performance, regarding of its name
2. Respondents: healthcare providers
3. Primary data gathered by the methods of survey, interview, and/or poll
4. Peer reviewed original articles or reports in Korean or English
5. Articles should include at least one item of the following content:
1) Providers’ awareness of pay-for-performance
2) Providers’ general attitudes to pay-for-performance (i.e., agree vs.
disagree)
3) Providers’ opinions on the effects of pay-for-performance such as
the its effect on quality of care, behavioral change, or financial
perspectives
4) Providers’ opinions on desirable pay-for-performance design and
implementation
5) Concerns on implementation of pay-for-performance including
unintended consequences
6) Description on barriers or limitation for pay-for-performance
implementation
1. Articles that did not deal with pay-for-performance
2. Articles in which respondents were not healthcare providers
3. Articles that used secondary data from other studies
4. Review articles
Figure 1. Search strategy flow chart. +JO:POH-FFFUBM
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Table 2. Study descriptions for articles included in the final analysis
Citation Country Program Target No. of eligible
population
No. of study
participants Survey method
Pines JM et al.,
2007 [35]
Locke RG et al.,
2008 [36]
McDonald R et
al., 2009 [28]
Young G et al.,
2010 [41]
Casalino LP et
al., 2007 [32]
Steiger B, 2005
[37]
Damberg CL,
2009 [34]
Reiter KL et al.,
2006 [38]
Goldman LE et
al., 2007 [40]
Lee SI et al.,
2010 [29]
Young GJ et al.,
2007 [30]
Erekson EA et al.,
2011 [31]
Natale JE et al.,
2011 [33]
Kaczorowski J et
al., 2011 [39]
USA
USA
USA & UK
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
Korea
USA
USA
USA
Canada
CMS & JCAHO
Non-specific P4P
The California
initiative & Quality
and Outcomes
Framework
Managed care plan
adopted a P4P
program (SNS-A) &
P4P for primary care
physicians focused
on a diabetes care
component (SNS-B)
Physician P4P
program
Non-specific P4P
Integrated Healthcare
Association P4P
program
Statewide hospital-
level P4P system
between Blue Cross
Blue Shield of
Michigan and 86
hospitals with which it
contracts
Non-specific P4P
Non-specific P4P
Non-specific P4P
Non-specific P4P
Non-specific P4P
P4P incentives for
preventive care
Chairpersons and medical
directors from hospitals with
emergency medicine training
programs in the USA
Primary care osteopathic
physician members of the
American Osteopathic
Association
In the England sample (20)
physicians from 2 regions & in
the California sample (20)
physicians from 4 organizations
that ranged in size from 600 to
3,000 physicians and health
care clinicians
Physicians from CHCs in
SNS-A and from medical
group in SNS-B
General internist
ACPE members (physician
executives)
182 Physician organizations
contracted with the seven
largest HMOs in California
86 Hospitals
Safety-net hospitals
All healthcare organizations in
Korea
The members of physician
organizations in
Massachusetts and California
The members of the
American Urogynecologic
Society
-
246 physicians from 24
primary care network or family
health network groups in 110
different sites across
southwestern Ontario
participated in the P-PROMPT
project
129
1000
20 (UK) & 20
(California)
256 Physicians from
13 CHCs (SNS-A) &
156 physicians from
three participating
medical groups
1168 from 1668
randomly selected
general internists
listed in the AMA
physician master-file
7444
35 Physician
organizations
86 Hospitals
-
All tertiary teaching
hospitals, general
hospital, and hospital
and randomly
selected 2000 clinics
-
A total 1203 members
of the American
Urogynecologic
Society
Medical directors
from all 19 CCS-
approved PICUs
-
90
123
20 (UK) & 20
(California)
56% (SNS-A) & 63%
(SNS-B)
556
932
35 Physician
organizations: in 14
organizations
replaced with similar
organizations 
65 Hospitals
37 Hospitals
522 Healthcare
organizations,
including 31 tertiary
teaching hospitals,
182 general hospitals,
158 hospitals, and
152 clinics
1243 physicians: 689
from California and
554 from
Massachusetts
212 members of the
American
Urogynecologic
Society
16 CCS-approved
PICUs
115 physicians
completed both pre-
intervention and post-
intervention survey
Online
questionnaire
Mailed survey
Face to face
interview using
the same topic
guide
Mailed survey
Mailed survey
Poll
Interview
Structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Web-based
survey
Mailed survey
Web-based
survey
Postal service
and fax
transmission
Fax survey
USA, United States of America; CMS, Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services; JCAHO, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations; P4P,
pay-for-performance; UK, United Kingdom; CHC, community health centers; AMA, American Medical Association; ACPE, American College of Physician
Executives; HMO, Health Maintenance Organization; CCS, California Children’s Services; PICU, Pediatric Intensive Care Unit; P-PROMPT, Provider and Patient
Reminders in Ontario: Multi-Strategy Prevention Tools. )FBMUIDBSF1SPWJEFSTs "UUJUVEFTGPS11
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Table 3. Healthcare providers’ attitudes on P4P: general attitudes and its effects
Citation
General attitudes Effects
Awareness Agree/disagree Reasons Behavioral change Effect on quality of care Financial impact
Pines JM et al.,
2007 [35]
Locke RG et al.,
2008 [36]
McDonald R et
al., 2009 [28]
Young G et al.,
2010 [41]
Casalino LP et al.,
2007 [32]
Steiger B, 2005 [37]
Damberg CL,
2009 [34]
Reiter KL et al.,
2006 [38]
Goldman LE et
al., 2007 [40]
Lee SI et al., 2010
[29]
Young GJ et al.,
2007 [30]
Erekson EA et al.,
2011 [31]
Natale JE et al.,
2011 [33]
Kaczorowski J et
al., 2011 [39]
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Our study found,
however, that many
physicians were
unaware of the
target contents or
had a poor
understanding of
the relation between
their performance
and incentives
payments received
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Overall low
awareness to P4P.
Higher level
organizations were
more aware of P4P
than lower level
organizations
Low level of
awareness
Low level of
awareness
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Disagree on PN-5b
Skeptical 
UK- Supportive
US- Challenging to
their autonomy
Agree
We did not uncover
any opposition
against P4P
Supportive
Supportive
Agree
benefits outweigh
adverse
consequences
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Disagree except
tertiary teaching
hospitals
Agree
Not mentioned
Mixed agree and
disagree
Agree
Pn-5b will not lead to
improvement in quality
of care
The majority of survey
respondents were
skeptical that P4P would
appropriately capture
the quality of their work
and did not believe that
health outcomes should
influence their
reimbursement.
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Proponents- It is natural
that high performing
healthcare organizations
receive a financial
reward.
Opponents- P4P could
become a method of
government control over
healthcare organizations
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Physicians should be
financially rewarded for
better patient outcomes.
P4P is not an effective
way to improve patient
outcomes
Not mentioned
Yes
Respondents report a
number of operational
changes that are being
implemented to improve time
to antibiotics for pneumonia.
No
“Attention to meet these
performance goals” would
not cause significant change
in the healthcare of their
patients 
UK - P4P changed the
nature of the office visit.
US - It appeared to have little
impact on the nature of the
office visit.
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Yes
P4P has directly affected
organizational behavior by
increasing accountability for
quality, influencing the speed
of IT adoption for quality
management, and creating
greater organizational focus
and support for quality
programs and goals
Structure and process
changes in organizations
Not mentioned
Positive behavioral change
but clinics disagreed
No or minimal change
Not mentioned
Agree
PICU physicians would
change their behavior to
obtain a financial incentive
The established target levels
and bonuses provided
appropriate financial
incentive to substantially
increase the uptake of
mammography  and
Papanicolaou test
Disagree
Emergency department do
not agree that P4P incentives
targeting early administration
of antibiotics for patients with
pneumonia will lead to
improvement in quality of
care for these patients.
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
P4P may have minimal
short-term effect on quality
improvement.
It can lead to increase
P4P can improve quality
Limited
These changes did not
translate into the
breakthrough improvement
in quality desired by plans
and purchasers
Not mentioned
Improving quality
Increased but clinics
disagreed
It can improve quality
Neutral
Negative
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
No impact
72% felt that
health outcome
measurements
should not
influence their
reimbursement.
Not mentioned
No impact on
safety net setting
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
No significant
financial effects
Minimal financial
impact
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Positive effect
Physicians were
given bonus
P4P, pay-for-performance +JO:POH-FFFUBM
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Table 4. Healthcare providers’ attitudes on P4P: desirable design and implementation methods and concerns
Citation
Concerns Desirable design and 
implementation methods Clinical unintended consequences Other concerns
Pines JM et al.,
2007 [35]
Locke RG et al.,
2008 [36]
McDonald R et al.,
2009 [28]
Young G et al., 2010
[41]
Casalino LP et al.,
2007 [32]
Steiger B, 2005 [37]
Damberg CL, 2009 [34]
Reiter KL et al.,
2006 [38]
Goldman LE et al.,
2007 [40]
Lee SI et al., 2010
[29]
Young GJ et al.,
2007 [30]
Erekson EA et al.,
2011 [31]
Natale JE et al.,
2011 [33]
Kaczorowski J et al.,
2011 [39]
Yes
1) Possible solutions are to encourage hospitals to improve
overall operations by incentives focusing on the
improvement of fundamental measures of patient flow
2) provide incentives to hospitals to improve patient
safety across all diseases, or 
3) provide incentives for process improvement programs.
Programs such as these do not focus on specific
diseases and may benefit all patients.
Yes
Almost two-thirds of respondents indicated that the
insurer should rate them as individuals as opposed to
being pooled in their practice group.
1) This study suggests that the unintended consequences
of pay-for-performance programs are likely to vary according
to the design and implementation of these programs.
Therefore, when designing incentive schemes, more
attention needs to be paid to factors likely to produce
unintended consequences.
2) The potential adverse effects of external incentives on
motivation are likely to be diminished where individuals
identify with the goals and values of incentive programs
and feel that they have a degree of autonomy in their
delivery.
Not mentioned
1) Health plans and government will work hard to make
quality measures accurate.
2) Both individual and group evaluation can be possible.
1) Additional data needed, in addition to claiming data
2) Large organization is now under more favorable
conditions in current P4P setting so the rich get richer.
3) More acute indicators and those reflecting clinical
significance.
4) Incentives are not new money so there are always
winners and losers.
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
1) Government should support to gather quality data.
2) Government should reduce additional cost resulted
from P4P.
1) Voluntary participation
2) The organizational performance should be evaluated
3) P4P should reward both high performers and
performance improvers with financial incentives, but
should not penalize low performers.
4) Additional funding should be set aside for financial
incentives.
5) Not only medical claim data but also other clinical data
should be used in evaluation.
6) Government or health plans should pay for reporting.
Not mentioned
1) Performance measures not adjusting for the
comorbidity of individual patients
2) The need for the development and utilization of
appropriate performance measures
3) Doubt of adequacy of data
4) Careful monitoring of unintended consequences
5) Educating physicians about P4P
They are wary of the accuracy and validity of data used
to generate these performance measures and are
discouraged by the time and costs required to collect self
information.
Not mentioned
Yes
1) The provision of antibiotics before chest radiograph
results
2) the prioritization of chest radiographs over other
radiographs
3) and the prioritization of patients with suspected
pneumonia.
Yes
1) These initiatives may focus attention on areas that are
not of primary concern during a specific visit between
patient and provider-which may cause physicians to miss
other important quality goals.
2) If a patient presents with a stressful social and medical
issue (eg, depression, elder abuse), the physician might
spend time addressing issues that could dramatically
improve a patient’s life but are not part of measurement
guidelines.
3) The P4P measures, which will be difficult to implement
for many primary care physicians, may also penalize
practitioners who treat patients in underserved
populations that may not have the resources to follow
physician recommendations.
1) The inability of Californian physicians to exclude
individual patients from performance calculations caused
frustration. 
2) Some physicians reported such undesirable behaviors
as forced disenrollment of noncompliant patients.
The survey data did not point to any substantial concerns
about unintended consequences. 
1) Measuring quality may lead physicians to avoid high-
risk patients.
2) Measuring quality will divert physicians’ attention from
important types of care for which quality is not measured.
1) Dumping: non-compliant or difficult patients
2) Cherry Picking: they prefer the patients who give them
high reimbursement
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Healthcare providers voiced significant concerns about
the potential of unintended consequences including  1)
avoiding of high-risk patients, 2) ignoring quality of care in
unmeasured areas, 3) neglecting compulsory medical
services to maximize financial reward, and 4) the
possibility that medical records could be manipulated
Not serious
High risk patients will be penalized as they tend to have
(worse) outcomes
Included among these worries that patient data and results can
be manipulated by administrators and practitioners, making
accurate comparison impossible. One such manipulation is the
avoidance of high-risk patients or procedures by physicians.
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
They are not ready to implement P4P in terms of
technology (IT and EMR). Thus, they need educational
support
1) Threats to the ongoing physician-patient relationship
2) US-their autonomy was being challenged
3) The computerized support required to deliver the
targets.
Safety net providers face complicated and diverse
patient needs that compete with P4P’s quality goals for
clinicians’ time and energy. One way to mitigate this
factor is by improving these providers’ access to
information technology.
Quality measures are not adequately adjusted for
patients’ medical conditions or socioeconomic status.
Physicians spending more time making sure they are
meeting certain guidelines rather than treating patients.
Some poll participants say P4P is just a convenient way
to get physicians and health care organization to adopt
better technology.
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
1) The cost and accuracy of data collection
2) The difficulty of getting accurate performance data
3) How to adjust case-mix, in particular, underserved
patients
Not mentioned
A lack of quality improvement infrastructure is a major
barrier to achieving pay-for-quality goal
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
P4P, pay-for-performance; IT, information technology; EMR, electronic medical record.)FBMUIDBSF1SPWJEFSTs "UUJUVEFTGPS11
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measures are accurate, physicians should be given
financial incentives for quality [29,30,32,33]; 2)
financial incentives are an effective way to improve the
quality of healthcare [29,30,32]; 3) the benefits outweigh
adverse consequences [34]; and 4) financial rewards are
more effective as an incentive compared to non-financial
rewards such as peer recognition [32]. However,
opponents were concerned that 1) P4P will not lead to
improved quality of care [31,35]; 2) they were skeptical
that P4P would appropriately capture the quality of care
[29,36]; 3) the incentive program was perceived as
something externally imposed and managed, which
made physicians feel that their autonomy was being
challenged or that they were not trusted to perform in the
absence of incentive payments [28]; 4) P4P could
become a new method of government control over
healthcare organization [29], and 5) P4P would result in
unintended consequences [28,29,31-33,35-37].
We have summarized the effects resulting from P4P
program in terms of behavioral change, effect on quality
of care, and financial impact in Table 3. Regarding
behavioral change, some healthcare providers reported
that they have changed their behaviors to meet the
quality goals. These behavioral changes included the
structural modification and process alteration at the
physician or organization level. At the organizational
level, for example, Pines et al. [35] reported a number of
operational changes that are being implemented to
improve time to antibiotics for pneumonia. Also,
Damberg et al. [34] reported that P4P has directly
affected organizational behaviors by increasing
accountability for quality, influencing the speed of IT
adoption for quality management, and creating greater
organizational focus and support for quality programs
and goals. In addition, other studies indicated that
structure and process change to reach the quality
standard occurred at the organizational level [29,38]. At
the physician level, even though three studies reported
that physicians changed their behaviors to obtain
financial incentives [28,33,39], other studies denied the
fact that P4P induced behavioral changes at the
physician level [30,32,36].
As for quality, their opinions on the effect of P4P were
still controversial (Table 3). Some studies reported that
healthcare providers believe P4P will increase the quality of
cares [29,30,32,37,40] while others believe that the effect
on quality will be a lack of or limited impact [29,33-35,41].
Lastly, regarding financial impact, only one study reported
healthcare providers believe there are significant financial
impacts [39]. Instead, other healthcare providers thought
that financial gains would be limited or minimal [36,41].
III. Desirable Pay-for-performance Design
and Their Concerns
Table 4 showed healthcare providers’ attitudes on
desirable P4P design and concerns. In order to
summarize providers’ opinions, we categorized their
points of view into eight general issues such as
participation method, evaluation unit and reward
recipient, quality indicators, funding, quality of data,
additional costs, unintended consequences, and
government or health plan’s support.
In relation to participation method, only one study
directly mentioned that healthcare providers prefer
voluntary participation in P4P program, not mandatory
participation [29]. Regarding evaluation unit and
reward recipients, some providers preferred individual-
(or physician-) based performance evaluation, and
therefore financial incentives should be given to
physicians who achieved the goal of quality [36].
However, other providers believe financial incentives
should provide medical group or healthcare
organization based on the result of organizational
performance evaluation [29,35]. 
Also, many healthcare providers had serious concerns
about current quality indicators [29,31-33,36,37]. They
believed that current quality indicators did not
appropriately reflect on their clinical situations. For
example, they believe quality measures cannot be
adequately adjusted for patients’ medical conditions or
socioeconomic status [32]. Therefore they wanted
purchasers to work hard to make quality measures
accurate and reflect clinical significance [37].
How to raise funds for financial incentives is another
important issue. One article concerned that incentives
are not new money so there are always winners and
losers [37]. In addition, another study reported that
additional funding for P4P should be prepared for
financial rewards [29]. That is, healthcare providers
prefer to receive additional financial incentives without
penalties.
In order to evaluate quality, healthcare providers
should gather correct and accurate quality data and
should hand in the data to purchasers. However, they felt
that this process is very stressful and they could pay
additional costs [29,31,33,37]. Also, for accurate quality
evaluation, they believe more data needed, in addition to
claims data [29,31,33,37,40]. Therefore, they desired
that government or health plans should support the
gathering of quality data and should pay for the
additional costs or reduce the costs of data collection
[29,40]. +JO:POH-FFFUBM
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Unintended consequences were one of the most vital
issues in designing and implementing P4P. Even though
one article reported that unintended consequences would
not be so serious [30], most healthcare providers had
serious concerns that P4P would induce unintended
consequences [28,29,31-33,35-37]. 
Lastly, the providers felt that they need some support
from the government or health plan to make the P4P
program more successful. For instance, some articles
mentioned that healthcare providers need technical and
educational support such as IT infrastructure and
electronic medica record [28,30,36,37,40,41].
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Through the results of our systematic review, we
determined that healthcare providers have common
attitudes regarding several factors of P4P but different
attitudes toward P4P programs. Different attitudes seem
to show that healthcare providers are under different P4P
settings so their main interests could also be diverse. In
fact, one study reported that these contextual differences
could explain successful implementation of P4P [42]
and the context of P4P was considered to be an
important factor in other systematic reviews of
evaluation of its effect [43]. Therefore, we reported the
content as close as possible to the original expressions.
At the same time, we could also extract valuable lessons
from their common or diverse opinions. We believe that
those opinions could give lessons for successful design
and implementation of P4P. Following is what
purchasers should consider in making a more successful
P4P program.
I. Do Healthcare Providers Correctly
Understand What Pay-for-performance Is?
The purpose of this study was to investigate healthcare
providers’ attitude toward P4P. To do so, ultimately
purchasers can reflect their opinions on designing and
implementing P4P programs. Therefore, the basic
hypothesis was that they could correctly understand the
concept, evaluation method, and the relationship
between performance and rewards. However, our results
indicated that some healthcare providers still have a low
level of awareness about P4P [28-31]. If the low level of
awareness or understanding about P4P among healthcare
providers is a general phenomenon, that would be a
serious barrier to implementing a P4P program. As
noted, purchasers should note that the provider’s support
is essential for the success of P4P [31,32]. Therefore,
before implementing P4P programs, purchasers should
grasp whether providers are correctly aware of the P4P.
If not, they should make an effort to increase the level of
awareness such as understanding of the quality
indicators and the criteria and methods for distributing
financial incentives. This could be a meaningful starting
point to reconsider current P4P program. If they have
incorrect knowledge about P4P, and if this results in
distorted attitudes toward the P4P program, then each
P4P program could not get a sufficient degree of support
from providers. In order to increase the level of
awareness of providers’ knowledge and attitudes about
P4P, adequate educational support should be provided
with them by the health plan or professional societies.
Actually, one study reported that providers were more
likely to support P4P programs when they had received
information about these programs from their
professional societies [24].
II. Why Do They Support or Object to Pay-
for-performance?
Purchasers should pay attention to the reason they
oppose P4P. The reasons of opposing P4P may be quite
different according to their P4P settings. However, our
results showed very interesting phenomenon. That is,
two opinions are separated based on different points of
attitudes on the same issue. For example, proponents
support P4P because it can lead to improve the quality of
care and benefits outweigh adverse consequences. On
the other hand, opponents disagree on P4P because it
cannot lead to improvement in the quality of care and it
would result in several unintended consequences. In
summary, purchasers should listen to the voices of
opponents. If their reasons of objection are correctable or
based on misunderstandings, we can reflect their
opinions or try to fix them.
III. Strengthening Communication and
Collaboration With Providers in Design
and Implementation of Pay-for-
performance
To achieve the final goal of P4P, purchasers should
make cooperative relationship and communicate with
providers and professional societies. Like Healy and
Braithwaite [44] mentioned that “command and control”
would be replaced with “the new regulatory state”
seeking flexible, participatory, and devolved forms of
regulation. From this point of view, purchasers should)FBMUIDBSF1SPWJEFSTs "UUJUVEFTGPS11
+1SFW.FE1VCMJD)FBMUI	

have patience to persuade providers and facilitate their
supportive participation. In particular, in the designing
stage of P4P program, purchasers should actively
communicate with providers and make an effort to
reflect their opinions regarding its primary target,
evaluation unit and reward recipients, participation
methods, carrots or sticks, and funding methods. Of
course, government or health plan cannot and should not
accept all opinions from providers. However, P4P is also
not a zero-sum game. They may often conflict with each
other but can cooperate to make better P4P program. 
IV. Developing Quality Measures Accurate
and Reflecting Clinical Significance
Purchasers should work hard to develop accurate
quality measures and reflect clinical significance [37].
According to our study, many healthcare providers had
serious concerns about quality measures or indicators.
However, there is no perfect evaluation method.
Therefore, purchasers should make a continuous effort to
monitor and revise current quality indicators regularly in
order to reflect providers’ professional opinions.
V. Minimizing the Unintended Consequences
Purchasers should take actions to minimize the
unintended consequences. From the articles reviewed in
this study, we could summarize their concerns about
unintended consequences [28,29,31-33,35-37]: avoiding
high-risk patients; ignoring quality of care; neglecting
compulsory services; inappropriate behavioral changes;
and threatening professional autonomy. Maybe, each
P4P program can confront different kinds of unintended
consequences and its solutions would be also quite
different. Although these undesirable consequences
cannot be eliminated in the real world, some of them can
be fixed or minimized by purchasers.
VI. Are Providers Ready to Implement Pay-
for-performance?
Purchasers should pay attention to whether their
providers get ready to launch P4P. Also, purchasers
should make a plan to decrease the providers’ burdens
and supportive environments. According to our results,
some providers believe they were not ready to or
appropriately prepared to initiate P4P [36] and had
concerns about infrastructure for P4P introduction such
as IT and the quality of data et al [28,30,31,36,37,40,41].
Technical or financial supports such as providing grants
for establishing IT infrastructure, providing education
sessions, and sharing costs for additional data collection
can be useful strategies for soft-landing of P4P program. 
VII. Study Limitation 
There could be several limitations in this study. One is
incompleteness of literature search. Although we used
wide range of search terms and references of searched
articles, some studies related with this topic might be
missed. In addition we did not use comprehensive
source of references such as expert’s opinion, qualitative
studies, secondary data analysis. Second, there is a
possibility that providers might intentionally express
negative responses to some questions in their survey in
order to get a better strategic position in the future P4P.
The third limitation is about the heterogeneity of the
articles reviewed in the perspectives of healthcare
settings, respondents, and questionnaires. As stated, this
heterogeneity could be related with healthcare providers’
attitudes in each article. Therefore, we intended to
describe and summarize the authors’ opinions on items
by studies rather than provided a single result. 
$0/$-64*0/
Recently P4P programs have been proliferating across
the world, and their main goal was to increase the quality
of care by providing financial incentives to healthcare
providers. In this study, we reviewed their attitudes
toward P4P. Considering their opinions on designing and
implementing P4P would be the first step to make more
successful P4P programs because they are important
stakeholders and key players. Therefore, the purchaser
should make more effort such as increasing providers’
level of awareness about P4P, providing technical and
educational support, reducing their burden of additional
data collection, developing a cooperative relationship
with providers, developing more accurate quality
measures, and minimizing unintended consequences.
Since providers’ attitudes might depend on the specific
context of the P4P program, a survey of the providers’
attitudes using items included in this study could be
helpful for the soft-landing of a new P4P program.
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